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Abstract
Efficient cognitive decisions should be adjustable to incoming novel information. However, most current models of decision
making have so far neglected any potential interaction between intentional and stimulus-driven decisions. We report here
behavioral results and a new model on the interaction between a perceptual decision and non-predictable novel
information. We asked participants to anticipate their response to an external stimulus and presented this stimulus with
variable delay. Participants were clearly able to adjust their initial decision to the new stimulus if this latter appeared
sufficiently early. To account for these results, we present a two-stage model in which two systems, an intentional and a
stimulus-driven, interact only in the second stage. In the first stage of the model, the intentional and stimulus-driven
processes race independently to reach a transition threshold between the two stages. The model can also account for
results of a second experiment where a response bias is introduced. Our model is consistent with some physiological results
that indicate that both parallel and interactive processing take place between intentional and stimulus-driven information.
It emphasizes that in natural conditions, both types of processing are important and it helps pinpoint the transition
between parallel and interactive processing.
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Introduction
Research on human action control typically distinguishes
between two types of action: re-actions issued in response to some
external stimulus event and voluntary actions based on an internal
decision to act [1,2]. There has been a long-standing debate on
whether these two types of action are controlled by two different
brain systems. Some studies using neurophysiological, behavioural
or neuropsychological methods suggest that this is indeed the case
[3–6; for review, see Refs. 2,7]. Patients suffering from ‘‘utilization
behaviour’’ (UB), for example, show a strong tendency to use
objects they spot in the environment without any clear need or
purpose [8]. This behaviour has been explained in terms of a lack
of inhibition and modulation of the external action system due to
damage in the voluntary system [8]. Other studies, however, point
to the existence of common control mechanisms. In a recent study
[9], for example, participants were asked to prepare and execute
left- or right-hand voluntary actions. Occasionally, the voluntary
action preparation was interrupted by a stimulus requiring either a
left- or right-hand response. The results showed that increased
voluntary motor preparation, as assessed by the readiness
potential, produced faster stimulus-driven responses on congruent
trials (i.e., when participants voluntarily prepared the same hand
that was also used in response to the target stimulus) than on
incongruent trials. This suggests that voluntary and stimulus-
driven actions share some central preparatory mechanisms.
It is evident that voluntary and stimulus-driven action control
are at least to some extent based on separate mechanisms, for the
simple reason that stimulus-driven but not voluntary action control
needs to be linked to the perceptual system. Conversely, it is also
obvious that voluntary and stimulus-driven action control are to
some extent based on common mechanisms, as it seems
undisputed that the most final steps of action execution use the
same cerebral structures. Therefore, we propose that an appro-
priate model to account for voluntary and stimulus-driven actions
should be composed of two stages, a first stage where the two types
of actions are dissociated and a second stage where they are
combined. Thus, the issue is not whether there are one or two
systems but rather where the transition between the two stages is.
As a consequence, to better understand the interaction between
voluntary and stimulus-driven action control, we need to develop
tools that embrace the notion of the existence of both differences
and commonalities between voluntary and stimulus-driven action
and that are capable of pinpointing them.
The goal of the current study is to provide evidence for a two-
stage model of action control. Our study is very tightly rooted in a
new methodological approach developed by Stanford and
colleagues [10–12]. Participants are required to initiate a choice
response to a left or right target stimulus. Importantly, the target is
presented with a variable delay, called gap, after participants began
to prepare their action. For very short gaps the action is truly
stimulus-driven, whereas for long gaps, it is truly intentional, as
participants no longer have the time to take the stimulus into
account. For intermediate gap durations, the target is possibly able
to influence the ongoing voluntary action preparation. This
paradigm mimics situations in which we have to anticipate and
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start preparing an action even before the stimulus the action is
supposed to respond to is available, for instance, when a goal
keeper has to anticipate where the opponent will shoot the ball and
prepare his action even before having any visual cue. The
paradigm enables us to investigate whether, and if so, how and
from when on voluntary and stimulus-driven action preparation
interact.
In one of the studies the present expriment is based on
investigated monkeys were required to perform internally/
externally chosen left/right saccades [10]. The authors proposed
a race-to-threshold model where motor preparation for left/right
responses accumulates over time to account for the data [13–15].
Models where perceptual evidence accumulates over time have
indeed been supported by both behavioral and neurophysiological
studies [13–17]. However, this particular type of task [10] is not
purely perceptual in nature. The participant first starts to prepare
an action without the perceptual information being available. It is
clear that the evidence accumulated during this stage is not
‘‘perceptual’’, but rather internal. To this extent, the paradigm is
close in spirit to another one used in action control [18].
To capture this aspect of the task, the current research focuses
on how, precisely, internal (voluntary) and external (stimulus-
driven) accumulation of evidence interact. To model our results we
conceptualize internal and external accumulation of evidence as a
two-system process having both a separate and a common stage.
This hybrid model includes a transition threshold below which the
signals accumulate separately, and above which they interact
(resulting in facilitation in case of congruent and interference in
case of incongruent actions). Our experiments also allows us to
quantify the relative importance of each stage, thus demonstrating
that they are both necessary.
Results
Experiment 1: Behavioral results
In our task [10], participants were presented with a Go Signal
followed by the appearance of a Target Signal to the left or the right
of fixation and a distractor object on the other side (see Fig. 1). The
target was defined by its color (red or green) chosen randomly for
each trial and indicated to the participant as the color of the
fixation point. Participants were instructed to press a key (Go Key)
in response to the Go Signal and immediately afterwards to initiate
a choice response to the side of the target (left or right). The Target
Signal was presented after the Go Key with a variable delay called
gap. Therefore, in trials where the gap is too long, participants had
to initiate their choice response even before appearance of the
Target Signal. In order to prevent participants from waiting for
the presentation of the target and from answering systematically
too quickly without taking into account the target, a feedback
procedure was introduced that encompassed both speed and
accuracy performance (see Methods for details). All participants
had an accuracy above chance (mean= 71.5% correct,
SD=5.8%).
We present data pooled across all ten participants. As
anticipated, accuracy significantly decreased as the gap increased
(F(10,99) = 9.4, p,0.0001), simply because participants did not
have any opportunity to revise their initial decision if the gap was
too long. In addition, Response Times (RT), that is, the time
between the Go Key press and the choice response, increased
gradually with increasing gap (F(10,99) = 6.6, p,0.0001). Howev-
er, the slope of RT increase with gap was less than one for all
participants (mean estimated slope = 0.34, maximum of the upper
bound of the 95% individual confidence interval = 0.71) indicating
that participants possibly waited for the target to appear on some
trials but not all (Fig. 2 A–B).
A key variable of the analysis is the raw Processing Time (rPT)
introduced by Stanford and colleagues (10). The rPT is the time
during which the target information was available before the
choice response was carried out. More precisely, the raw
processing time is defined as: rPT=RT { Gap. Thus, positive
values correspond to a choice response after target onset, and
negative values correspond to a response before target onset. The
percentage of correct choice responses increased sharply with rPTs
(Fig. 2C): under a critical value of rPT (202 ms6.4, s.e. computed
with a Bootstrap procedure) responses were given at random
whereas above this value accuracy reached quickly 100%. Fig. 2D
shows the normalized distribution of the rPTs separately for
correct and error trials. The distribution of correct choice
responses looks like the superposition of two component distribu-
tions, one identical to the rPT distribution in the case of erroneous
responses, and one specific to correct responses. This component
reflects actions carried out without perceptual information being
taken into account (because the rPT was too short). The second
component of the correct distribution, corresponding to longer
rPTs, reflects actions in response to the target.
Modeling
We propose a hybrid model in which the decision of a particular
choice response is the result of a two-stage race between an
internal variable that codes randomly for one or the other response
and an external variable that codes for the target side. During the
first stage of the race, the two variables accumulate independently,
each at a constant rate drawn from a lognormal distribution of a
certain mean and variance. The internal variable starts accumu-
lating as soon as the Go key is pressed while the external variable
starts accumulating only at the appearance of the target (see Fig. 3).
Indeed, until target presentation the participant has no sensory
information to rely on.
It is only after both variables crossed a first threshold, the
Transition Threshold, that the common stage starts where the
external variable influences the internal one. We distinguish
congruent from incongruent trials depending on whether internal
Author Summary
The topic of our study is the interaction between intentional
and externally-driven actions. The contemporary literature
on motor control in primates clearly distinguishes two
neural mechanisms for these two types of actions. We
believe that this distinction is artefactual and comes in part
from the fact that intentional and externally-driven actions
have been studied by different groups of researchers, using
different methodologies. In real life however, voluntary
planned actions such as making a cup of tea are often
interrupted by other actions in response to the outside
world. In the present study, we specifically investigate the
interaction between intentional and externally-driven ac-
tions. We asked participants to anticipate their response to
the delayed appearance of a target. We find strong
interactions between the prepared action and the target-
triggered response: perceptual decisions are quicker when
the two actions are congruent. To account for our
behavioral results, we propose a computational model that
is based on two stages, the first in which external and
internal evidence accumulate separately, and the second in
which internal processes are modulated by externally-
driven ones. This model allows us to establish that
intentional and externally-driven actions really interact only
in half of the decision making process.
Intentional and Reactive Decisions
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and external variables code for the same or different responses. In
congruent trials, the external facilitates the internal variable. In
contrast, in incongruent trials, the external inhibits the internal
variable. The first variable to cross the second threshold, the
Response Threshold, triggers execution of the action it codes. In our
task the action is most often triggered by the internal variable
because the internal variable always starts accumulating first.
However, it can happen (especially for short gaps) that the external
crosses the second threshold before the internal crosses the first
threshold. In that case that resembles a traditional reaction time
experiment, the action is purely triggered by the external stimulus.
Please notice that the RT distributions are necessarily a mixture
of congruent and incongruent trials (where internal and external
variables coded for the same or different responses). However, the
congruency of the two variables is in principle unknown to the
experimenter, as the internal decision of the participant is not
known. To deal with this problem, we present a method to
estimate the distributions for the two types of trials (congruent and
incongruent) in the second Experiment.
The model includes seven parameters: the means mi,með Þ and
standard deviations si,seð Þ of the lognormal distribution of the
internal and external accumulation rates, the Transition Thresh-
old ht (the Response Threshold is set arbitrarily to 1000, all other
parameters being scaled relative to this value),the acceleration
factor A that represents the time needed for the external variable to
fully influence the internal one, and an execution delay eD.
Table 1 presents the values of the parameters corresponding to
the best fit for each participant obtained by maximizing the
likelihood of the rPT distribution (the averaged model fit is
represented as continuous lines in Fig. 2).
Because our task is similar to that used by Stanford et al. [10],
we can compare the performance of our hybrid model with their
model, which is a single race-to-threshold between two decision
variables, representing right and left choices. The two variables
start accumulating with randomly drawn rates, then, after the gap,
color discrimination affects the decision process by accelerating the
variable representing the target side and decelerating the variable
of the distractor side. Without affecting the spirit of their model,
we used a slightly simplified version that contained only eight
parameters rather than eleven (see Text S1). We also compared
our model to a simpler version of it that was used in another task
[19], a version of the drift diffusion model [13] adapted to our task
and an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process [20]. In this model there is
only an independent race stage without then transition threshold.
We compared the models at the group level [21] using BIC
(Bayesian Information Criterion) and AIC (Akaike Information
Figure 1. Sequence of trial events. The fixation dot indicates the target color. As soon as the participant hears a sound, the Go Signal, she is
required to press one of two Go Keys (‘2’ or ‘8’ on a numeric keypad). Which Go Key to press is indicated by the pitch of the Go signal. After a variable
time Gap (0–330ms) that starts when the participant presses the Go Key, a target and a distracter dots appear on either side of the fixation dot. The
participant has to initiate her motor response (pressing the key on the left or right of the Go Key to indicate her choice of target location)
immediately after pressing the Go Key, even though the actual location of the target is available only after the Gap.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003013.g001
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Criterion) for each model and each subject as a measure of
evidence. The performance of our model was superior to the other
models: the exceedance probability [21], i.e. the probability that
our model was the more frequent in our population of subject, was
greater than .95 both for the AIC criteria and the BIC criteria (see
Table S1, S2 in Text S1 for the individual AIC and BIC values).
Experiment 2: Introducing a bias to estimate the
congruent/incongruent distributions
Our model is based in part on the accumulation of evidence of
an internal variable that is aimed arbitrarily to one side or the
other. When this internal variable crosses the transition threshold,
it starts to be affected by the stimulus-driven process. At that point,
Figure 2. Behavioral results and model performance in Experiment 1. In A, B, and C behavioral data for N = 10 subjects are represented in
dashed red lines with the red area corresponding to 61 s.e. of inter-subjects variability. Results labeled ‘‘model’’ are the averaged fit of the ten
subjects using parameters of Table 1. (A) Percentage of correct responses as a function of time gap. (B) Mean reaction time (RT) with standard
deviation for the whole data set as a function of time gap. (C) Percentage of correct responses as a function of raw Processing Time (rPT). (D)
Normalized frequencies of rPT for correct (red area) and incorrect trials (green area). In C and D bin width is 35 ms. See Fig. S1 in Text S1 for the fit of a
typical subject.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003013.g002
Figure 3. Illustration of congruent and incongruent trials in the Hybrid model. The internal variable starts accumulating as soon as the Go
Key is pressed whereas the external variable starts accumulating after tGap which varies across trials. During the first stage, the two variables
accumulate independently. As soon as both variables have entered the common part (at tc), the external variable starts influencing the internal one:
for congruent trials (A) the internal accumulation rate increases in a smooth way to reach the sum of the initial internal rate and the external rate. (B)
In incongruent trials the internal variable is inhibited and its rate decreases to reach the difference between the initial internal rate and the external
rate. Note that congruent trials are always correct, whereas incongruent trials can be incorrect.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003013.g003
Intentional and Reactive Decisions
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the stimulus-driven process can either facilitate or inhibit the
intentional process, depending on whether the initial decision is
congruent or incongruent with the stimulus. Unfortunately, in our
first experiment, there is no way to analyze separately the
congruent and incongruent conditions, simply because we do not
know what the initial decision was. Rather than asking explicitly to
the participant what his initial decision was at the end of each trial,
we slightly modified the design of our first experiment. In order to
estimate the rPT distributions separately for congruent and
incongruent trials, we introduced a frequency bias in the second
experiment. Unbeknown to the participants, the probability of the
target being on one or the other side depended on the pitch of the
Go signal. We refer to the side that had the higher probability
(65%) to be the target side as the ‘‘more frequent side’’.
Eleven out of fourteen participants expressed the expected
response bias for the more frequent side. The bias ranged from
55% to 75% (mean= 65.3%, SD=6%). The data of these eleven
participants were analyzed together. The remaining three subjects
were excluded from the analysis either because the bias was too
extreme or absent. The basic features of the results of Experiment
2 are identical to Experiment 1 (see Fig. S2 in Text S1).
We adapted our hybrid model to this second experiment. In the
model described earlier, both sides were chosen with the same a
priori probability. The response bias in the current experiment is
modeled by introducing a bias a on the choice of the internal
variable for the more frequent side. If participants did adapt
perfectly to our experimental setup, the value of a should be 0.65.
The new hybrid model including this additional bias parameter
was adjusted to the individual data; the average of the best fits for
each subject is superimposed on the curves in Fig. S2 in Text S1
and their parameters are shown in Table 2.
In the model, the external and the internal variables either code
for the same side or they code for different sides, thereby defining
congruent and incongruent trials. As a consequence, rPT
distributions can be seen as the mixtures of two distributions
corresponding to congruent and incongruent trials. Because of the
bias in the model, the proportion of correct trials on the more
frequent side is a for congruent trials and (1- a) for incongruent
trials. On the less frequent side, the proportion of correct trials is
(1- a) for congruent trials and a for incongruent trials. Using a
linear transformation accounting for the bias we can thus estimate
the rPT distributions for correct congruent and incongruent trials
(Fig. 4). The figure reveals that target information needs more time
to influence incongruent trials than congruent ones, notably the
incongruent model distribution peaks 48 ms later than the
congruent one. Keeping in mind that the external variable always
codes for the correct side, error trials are thus necessarily
incongruent trials. Therefore, the rPT distribution of error
incongruent trials can be computed by taking all the error trials
together.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to assess and model the
interaction of stimulus-driven and voluntary action control.
Participants were presented with the stimulus of a speeded
perceptual discrimination task during the preparation of a
voluntary action. Depending on the time gap between the
beginning of the trial and the presentation of the target stimulus,
voluntary action preparation was differently advanced when the
target appeared, thus, enabling us to trace the effect of voluntary
action preparation on stimulus-driven behavior.
In the first experiment, a good predictor of accuracy was the
raw processing time rPT, which is the time during which the target
information was available before the stimulus-driven choice
response was executed. For short rPTs, response accuracy was at
chance. However, as soon as rPTs exceeded a critical value, it
rapidly increased to reach ceiling performance. In other words, for
Table 1. Model parameter values in Experiment 1.
Participant hT si me si se eD(ms) A
1 552 1.4 1.4 1.2 0.3 125 21
2 493 1.6 1.0 1.7 0.4 129 11
3 404 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 120 76
4 428 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.4 111 81
5 528 2.1 1.4 1.9 0.4 130 10
6 559 2.3 1.3 1.8 0.4 127 21
7 502 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.4 141 73
8 491 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.4 138 8
9 498 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.3 121 106
10 427 1.4 1.2 1.2 0.5 173 12
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003013.t001
Table 2. Model parameter values in Experiment 2.
Participant hT si me si se eD(ms) A a
1 427 1.0 1.3 0.4 0.4 102 5 0.66
2 584 1.6 1.0 1.2 0.3 130 56 0.62
3 830 1.3 1.1 0.3 0.3 109 81 0.74
4 341 0.6 1.7 0.8 0.8 103 62 0.71
5 623 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.3 109 31 0.58
6 464 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.6 102 28 0.73
7 300 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.3 102 12 0.62
8 338 0.9 2.1 0.6 0.5 102 8 0.60
9 525 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.4 92 103 0.46
10 438 1.1 1.9 2.1 0.2 102 93 0.56
11 382 1.6 1.3 0.6 0.4 140 81 0.53
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003013.t002
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short rPTs participants performed in an internal mode, choosing
the response at random. It is only for longer rPTs that they take
target information into account. The transition between purely
internal and based-on-evidence modes was very fast although we
analyzed the pooled data set. This shows that both the critical rPT
value and the fast transition are quite robust among participants,
since inter-subject variability would smooth the curve. Overall, our
behavioural results are thus very much in line with the two
monkeys’ behaviour in in Stanford et al.’s study [10]. A critical
difference in the behavioural pattern concerns the RT that are
longer in our study, which is consistent with the fact that saccades
initiations (as in the monkey study) are much faster than manual
response [22].
To account for the shape of the distribution of rPTs, we
suggested a physiologically founded model, the hybrid model,
which is in essence a two-stage race model between a variable of
the external and a variable of the internal action system. Our
model is ‘‘hybrid’’ in two ways. First because it incorporates two
systems, external and internal, secondly because the race has two
stages: a stage at which evidence in the two systems accumulates
independently and a later stage at which evidence accumulation in
the two systems interacts. The distinction between internal and
external systems follows the literature of stimulus-driven and
voluntary action [5,6,8,18,23]. A recent study [24] that combines
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and pattern
recognition shows that this distinction between two systems is also
relevant in the framework of perceptual decision making. Indeed,
this study shows that decisions regarding highly visible stimuli are
predicted by visual brain areas, whereas it is not the case for low
visibility when participant decisions are at chance level. In the
latter case, the precuneus, which has been shown to encode ‘‘free’’
decisions [25], is a good predictor of the final choice. However,
our hybrid model does not reduce to a simple ‘‘switch’’ between a
guessing system and a perceptual decision system since it has two
stages. This fits with the growing body of evidence that
information processing is not purely sequential [26]. The
distinction of these two stages is based on the fact that the
external and the internal action routes are necessarily separated at
least up to some point, since the external system needs to make
contact to visual processing, and probably merged from that point
on. As outlined above, the hybrid model fits our data very well,
better than models that only incorporate a single system or a single
stage [10,13,19,20].
Since, in the hybrid model, accumulation of evidence occurs in
two systems, an external and an internal system, a particular trial
can be congruent or incongruent, external and internal variables
either coding for the same response or for different responses,
respectively. The congruency of a trial determines how the two
variables interact in the second stage of processing. In congruent
trials the internal variable is facilitated, whereas in incongruent
trials, it is inhibited. As a consequence rPTs of the based-on-
evidence component should be longer in incongruent than in
congruent trials. To test our model it was therefore essential to
have rPT distributions separately for congruent and incongruent
trials. However, note that it is difficult to know whether a
particular trial is congruent or incongruent, since this information
requires access to the variable coding for the internally chosen
action. One solution to this problem is to ask participants at the
end of the trial which action they initially prepared and, using
some brain imaging technique (e.g., EEG), to cross-check the
introspection of the subject (e.g., by means of ERPs; see Ref. [9]).
Here we chose a different approach: instead of relying on
participants’ introspection, we decided to deduce the congruent/
incongruent distributions analytically in the second experiment.
To do so, we made the probability of the target being presented on
one or the other side depends on the pitch of the Go signal. Due to
the induced response bias a, the rPT distributions of correct trials
result from a proportion of a congruent and (1-a) incongruent
Figure 4. Congruent and incongruent distributions. Model and behavioral rPT distributions for congruent (in blue) and incongruent trials
(green for correct and red for error trials), for N= 11 participants. Data curves (dashed lines) are obtained from the distributions for more frequent size
and less frequent size via a linear transformation. The colored area around the dashed lines represent +/2 s.e. of inter-subject variability. Model
curves are the averaged individual fits of the eleven subjects using the parameters given in Table 2. Bin width is 35 ms. (See Fig. S2 in Text S1 for the
rest of model and behavioral performance).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003013.g004
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trials for the more frequent response and from a proportion of (1-
a) congruent and a incongruent trials for the less frequent
response. Thus, in Experiment 2, we were able to estimate the rPT
distributions for correct congruent and incongruent trials by
means of a linear transformation; this was not possible in
Experiment 1, where a=1- a, making a linear transformation
impossible. The results show that ‘‘based-on-evidence’’ incongru-
ent trials correspond to longer rPTs than congruent trials,
suggesting interaction between the internal and the external
system. This is in agreement with the results reported in a recent
study [9] in which the authors found reaction times to be longer
for incongruent than for congruent trials.
The hybrid model also allows us to estimate the relative amount
of processing required in the two stages (independent and
common), as the relative importance of the two stages is captured
by the value of the transition threshold. Experiments 1 and 2
revealed that a considerable amount of processing is done in both
stages so that both stages are necessary. In both experiments, the
mean threshold was approximately around 50% of the overall
evidence accumulation, showing that about half of processing is
done separately and the other half in a combined way. Moreover,
the individual participant variability is well capture by our model.
In most previous modeling attempts, only one stage is present:
either the two variables accumulate independently of each other or
they interact during the whole race. For instance, a recent study
[27] introduced several race-to-threshold units to model a Go-No
Go task. If the variable in the Stop unit reaches its threshold before
the variable in the Go unit, it cancels the race of the later (see also
Ref. [28]). It is important to keep in mind that even though they
are simultaneous, the races in the different units stay independent
of each other: the rate of accumulation of one variable is not
influenced by any other. In other models, like the leaky
accumulator [15], variables inhibit each other during the whole
process. For instance, on the late distractor effect in saccadic
inhibition [29] has been successfully modeled by a dual input
combined with mutual.
To our knowledge, only one recent study has also proposed a
two-stage diffusion model. In an effort to account for behaviors
that resemble a change of mind in the course of a manual action,
Resulaj and colleagues [30] introduced a change of mind bound
and a change of mind deadline to the original diffusion process.
This model can be seen as the concatenation of two diffusion
processes where a second diffusion can be initiated after a first
decision. In contrast, our model clearly distinguishes a first stage
where two variables are processed independently from a second
stage where these variables interact. We believe that models based
on two stages of processing will be inspiring for future attempts of
modeling race-like phenomena.
Methods
Ethics statement
Participants were voluntary and gave their informed consent.
Research was approved by the Ethics committee for biomedical
research (CERB) Ile de France II.
Participants
Ten healthy participants with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision participated in the first experiment (6 males, 4 females;
mean age: 23 years and 3 months, SD: 1 year and 3 months).
Fourteen healthy participants with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision participated in the second experiment (8 male, 6 female;
mean age: 23 years and 5 months, SD: 2 years and 1 month). All
subjects were naive with respect to the goal of the experiment.
Material
Visual stimuli were presented on a computer screen LIYAMA
HM 903 DTA (19 in). The experiment was controlled using
Matlab and the Psychtoolbox [31,32]. Visual stimuli were two
colored dots (target and distractor), one red and one green
presented each on one side of a third dot. The color of the central
dot varied randomly from trial to trial. It was either red or green.
Each dot had a radius of 44 pixels and the distance between the
central dot and the peripheral dots was of 134 pixels, viewing
distance was 50 cm. An auditory signal of 50 ms duration
indicated the beginning of the task (Go signal). Its pitch varied
randomly on each trial. It was either high (1500 Hz) or low
(600 Hz).
Task details
Experiment 1. From the beginning of the trial and until the
Go signal, the participant was required to keep the ‘‘Home Key’’
pressed (Key 5 of the numeric keys of a standard keyboard). Before
the (Go signal) was presented, a dot appeared in the center of the
screen; its color was either red or green: this indicated the color of
the future target. After a delay randomly drawn from a normal
distribution of mean 1.6s and standard deviation 0.1s, an auditory
stimulus, the Go signal, was presented. Its pitch was either high or
low, thereby indicating the part of the numeric keypad the
participant have to use in the current trial. Just after the sound had
been presented, the participant was required to press one of the
two Go Keys: if the pitch was high, the participant had to press
Key 8 (Go Key 1), if it was low s/he had to press Key 2 (Go Key
2). Immediately after having pressed the Go key, the participant
had to initiate a motor action either to press the Key on the right
(9 and 3 for Go Key 1 and 2 respectively) or on the left of the Go
Key (7 and 1 for Go Key 1 and 2 respectively), although at this
point the identities of the target and distracter are still unknown.
These are revealed later after a time gap that was drawn from a
uniform distribution and varied between 0 and 330 ms (measured
from the moment the Go Key was pressed on) when a red and a
green dot appeared on either side of the central dot. The
participant was required to press the key on the side of the target.
The participant received feedback every 20 trials in the form of
2 scores: speed points corresponding to the number of trials over
the 20 last trials for which the responses was quick enough (the
delay between the auditory signal and the response had to be less
than 850 ms) and accuracy points corresponding to the number of
correct responses over the last 20 trials.
The experiment was divided into two sessions of about 45 min
each. The first session consisted in a training phase and the first
part of the test phase. The second session consisted in the second
part of the test phase. During the first part of the training phase,
only the speed score was given as a feedback, whereas during the
second part of the training phase both scores were provided.
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1,
except that a bias was introduced. Unbeknown to the participant,
the probability of the target being left or right of the central dot
depended on the pitch of the Go signal. For half of the
participants, after a high pitch, the target color appeared more
often on the right side (in 65% of cases); after a low pitch, the
target color appeared more often on the left side (65%). For the
other half it was the other way round. In the analysis we refer to
‘‘more frequent’’ side and ‘‘less frequent’’ side collapsing data
across the sounds and the two groups of participants. For instance,
in the first group of participants, the ‘‘more frequent side’’ side
refers to right if the sound was high pitched and left if the sound
was low pitched.
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Data analysis
In the two experiments we analyzed the pooled data of all
subjects excluding trials in which reaction time (RT) deviated
more than 4 standard deviations from the mean. We fitted the
Hybrid model, the single independent stage model [19], the
diffusion model [13], the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process [20] and
Stanford et al.’s model [10] by maximizing the likelihood of the
rPT distribution for each subject independently. We used the same
procedure in the second experiment to fit the Hybrid model with
the internal bias as an additional parameter. In the second
experiment, we inverted the matrix
a 1{a
1{a a
 
to find the
weights of the renormalized distribution of rPT for congruent and
incongruent trials as a mixture of the renormalized distribution of
rPT for ‘‘more frequent’’ and ‘‘less frequent’’ trials. We set a= .65,
the true bias.
Model description
In the Hybrid model, the decision process is split into two stages.
During the first stage, internal and external variables accumulate
without interacting until they reach their transition threshold and
enter the common part. In the common part, internal and external
variables interact in a way that depends on the congruency of
internal and external variables. The label (i.e., left or right) of the
internal variable is drawn randomly from a Rademacher
distribution. The initial accumulation rate r0i of the internal
variable during the first stage is drawn from a lognormal
distribution of mean mi and standard deviation si,
i.e.r0i*N(mi,si). Similarly, the accumulation rate re of the external
variable during the first stage is drawn from a lognormal
distribution of mean me and standard deviation se, i.e.
re*N(me,se). The internal variable starts accumulating as soon
as the go Key has been pressed at time t0 whereas the external
variable starts accumulating as soon as the cues have appeared on
the screen, i.e. at time t0ztGap (we consider no afferent delay for
sake of simplicity). We can thus write the value of the variables at
each time t during the first phase: xi(t)~ t{t0ð Þ:r0i and
xe(t)~ t{t0{tGap
 
:re (for twt0ztGap).
Once both variables have reached the transition threshold at
time tc, where tc is the first t to verify xi(t)whT and xe(t)whT , the
accumulation rate of the internal variable is influenced by the
external variable. More precisely, we have a distinction between
congruent and incongruent trials:
N In congruent trials, the final internal rate will be the sum of the
internal rate and external rate: r
f
i~r
0
izre:
N In incongruent trials, the final internal rate will be the
difference of the internal rate and of the external rate:
r
f
i~r
0
i{re:
The transition between r0i and r
f
i is continuous and follows the
differential equation:
N dri
dt
~A for congruent trials
N dri
dt
~{A for incongruent trials
The first variable to reach the common threshold determines
the side chosen, and the time at which it crosses the response
threshold plus the execution delay (eD) gives the reaction time.
Models comparison
We compared our Hybrid model with three other models based
on the rPT distribution obtained for each participant in the first
experiment. We used simulations to compute the likelihood of
each participant distribution of rPT under each model and sets of
parameters (see Text S1). The best set of parameters was obtained
by maximizing the likelihood (L) for each model, then we
computed the AIC and BIC for each subjects using the following
formulae for a model using p parameters, and n observed rPTs:
AIC~2p{2 ln(L)
BIC~p ln(n){2 ln(L):
Supporting Information
Text S1 Text S1 provides details about the model comparison
we perform, and displays the corresponding fits of a typical
participant.
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
We thank E. Salinas for providing details of the experimental procedure
and modeling in his article. [11]
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: MD FW PM. Performed the
experiments: MD. Analyzed the data: MD FW PM. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: MD PM. Wrote the paper: MD FW PM.
References
1. Passingham R, Bengtsonn S, Lau H (2010) Medial frontal cortex: From self-
generated action to reflection on one’s own performance. Trends in Cognitive
Science 14(1): 16–21.
2. Haggard P (2008) Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 9(12): 934–946.
3. Deiber MP, Honda M, Iban˜ez V, Sadato N, Hallett M (1999) Mesial motor
areas in self-initiated versus externally triggered movements examined with
fMRI: effect of movement type and rate. Journal of Physiology 81: 3065–
3077.
4. Jenkins I, Jahanshahi M, Jueptner M, Passingham R, Brooks D (2000) Self-
initiated versus externally triggered movements. Brain 118: 913–933.
5. Waszak F, Wascher E, Keller PI, Aschersleben G, Rosenbaum DA, et al (2005).
Intention-based and stimulus-based mechanisms in action selection. Experi-
mental Brian Research 162(3): 346–356.
6. Welchman AE, Stabley J, Schomers MR, Miall RC, Bu¨lthoff HH (2010) The
quick and the dead: when reaction beats intention. Proc R Soc London B 277:
1667–1674.
7. Krieghoff V, Waszak F, Prinz W, Brass M (2011) Neural and Behavioral
Correlates of Intentional Actions. Neuropsychologia 49(5): 767–776.
8. Boccardi E, Della Salla S, Motto C, Spinnler H (2002) Utilisation behavior
consequent to bilateral SMA softening. Cortex 38: 289–308.
9. Hughes G, Schu¨tz-Bosbach S, Waszak F (2011). One system of actions or two?
Evidence for common central preparatory mechanisms in voluntary and
stimulus-driven actions. Journal of Neuroscience 31(46): 16692–16699.
10. Stanford TR, Shankar S, Massoglia DP, Salinas E (2010) Perceptual decision
making in less than 30 milliseconds. Nature Neuroscience 13(3): 379–385.
11. Salinas E, Shankar S, Costello MG, Zhu D, Stanford TR (2010) Waiting is the
hardest part: comparison of two computational strategies for performing a
compelled response task. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience 4(153): 1–17.
12. Shankar S, Massoglia DP, Zhu D, Costello MG, Stanford TR, et al (2011).
Tracking the temporal evolution of a perceptual judgment using a compelled-
response task. Journal of Neuroscience 31: 8406–8421.
13. Ratcliff R (1978) A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review 85: 59–
108.
14. Carpenter RH, Williams ML (1995) Neural computation of log likelihood in
control of saccadic movements. Nature 377: 59–68.
15. Usher M, McClelland JL (2001) The time course of perceptual choice: the leaky,
competing, accumulator model. Psychological Review. 108(3): 550–592.
Intentional and Reactive Decisions
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 8 April 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e1003013
16. Shadlen MN, Newsome TW (1996) Motion perception: Seeing and deciding.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 113: 700–765.
17. Gold J I, Shadlen MN (2007) The neural basis of decision making. Annual
Review of Neuroscience 30: 535–574.
18. Obhi SS, Matkovitch S, Gilbert LS (2009) Modification of planned action.
Experimental Brain Research 192: 265–274.
19. Adam R, Bays PM, Husain M (2012) Rapid decision-making under risk.
Cognitive Neuroscience 3: 52–61.
20. Zhang J, Bogacz R (2010) Bounded Ornstein-Uhlenbeck models for two-choice
time controlled tasks. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 54: 322–333.
21. Stefan KE, Penny WD, Daunizeau J, Moran RJ, Friston KJ (2009) Bayesian
model selection for group studies. NeuroImage 46: 1004–1017.
22. Obhi SS, Haggard P (2004) Internally generated and externally triggered actions
are physically distinct and independently controlled. Experimental Brain
Research 156: 518–523.
23. Kirchner H, Thorpe SJ (2006) Ultra-rapid object detection with saccadic eye
movements: Visual processing speed revisited. Vision Research 46: 1762–1776.
24. Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD (2008) Unconscious determinants of
free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
25. Bode S, Bogler C, Soon CS, Haynes JD (2012) The neural encoding of guesses in
the human brain. NeuroImage 59(2): 1924–1931.
26. Cisek P, Kalaska JF (2010) Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world full
of action choices. Annual Review of Neuroscience 33: 269–298.
27. Noorani I, Gao MJ, Pearson CB, Carpenter RH (2011) Predicting the timing of
wrong decision with LATER. Experimental Brain Research 209: 587–598.
28. Hanes DP, Carpenter RH (1999) Countermanding saccades in Human. Vision
Research 39: 2777–2791.
29. Bompas A, Sumner P (2011) Saccadic inhibition reveals the timing of automatic
and voluntary signals in the human brain. The Journal of Neuroscience 31(35):
12501–12512.
30. Resulaj A, Kiani R, Wolpert DM, Shadlen MN (2009) Changes of mind in
decision making. Nature 461: 263–269.
31. Brainard DH (1997) The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision 10: 443–446.
32. Pelli DG (1997) The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics:
Transforming numbers into movies. Spatial Vision 10: 437–442.
Intentional and Reactive Decisions
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 9 April 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e1003013
